Editorial for Monday — February 14, 2005

• Nuclear Proliferaton: Fits and starts

Nuclear Proliferaton: Fits and starts

From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch Feburary 13, 2005

President Iraq turned George W. Bush’s well-intended efforts to keep nuclear weapons away from rogue states aren’t going well.

out to not have an active nuclear program. Iran, the object of various administration threats, is moving ahead with its nuclear program. Thursday, North Korea announced that it had built nuclear bombs, using Mr. Bush’s hostility as the reason or pretext.

Mr. Bush’s one qualified success is Libya, where Moammar Qaddafi decided it was in his best interest to give up his nuclear ambitions and reconnect with the world community. But the disclosure last week that Libya had received uranium from North Korea underscores the danger of Kim Jong Il’s regime.

Mr. Bush is 100 percent right in assessing the danger of rogue regimes with nuclear weapons. But because he has overextended the U.S. military in a country that did not have an active nuclear program, he can’t credibly threaten to fight a war against stronger countries that do.

In addition, by identifying Iran and North Korea as part of the “axis of evil,” Mr. Bush has given the mullahs in Iran and the dictator in North Korea reason to pursue nuclear weapons: to deter a U.S. attack. In Iran, the U.S. threats on the nuclear issue also run counter to the U.S. effort to encourage democracy; reformers support the nuclear program as much as the mullahs.

Mr. Bush’s overall approach has some good points. In Iran, the United States seems to be playing the bad cop while Europeans play the good cop. Mr. Bush’s support of six-party talks to pressure North Korea also is sensible. If anyone can pressure North Korea to pull back from its nuclear program, it is China. In this context, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s statement urging North Korea to return to the talks and avoid isolation is logical. The problem is that Kim Jong Il may see greater contact with the rest of the world as a threat to his pursuit of 21st-century Stalinism.

The United States may have to become more directly involved in both Iran and North Korea. If European diplomats are to succeed in persuading Iran to turn away from a nuclear weapons program, the United States may have to sweeten the pot of inducements offered to Tehran. The administration also should consider whether direct negotiations with North Korea – offering food and fuel in return for an end to the nuclear program – might be more effective than the current unproductive course.